Full text of judge's ruling on detachment

STATE OF WISCONSIN

CIRCUIT COURT

RUSK COUNTY



Ladysmith-Hawkins School District,

Appellant

vs.

School District Boundary Appeal Board,

Respondent.



DECISION

Case No. 09 CV 105



PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Ladysmith-Hawkins School District (Ladysmith or District) appeals a decision of the School District Boundary Appeals Board (SDBAB or Board). The Board determined that five separate petitions submitted by various electors be granted which effectively transferred the “Hawkins” community from Ladysmith District to the Flambeau District. The Board’s decision was rendered May 26, 2009. Ladysmith timely filed its appeal to the circuit court on June 17, 2009. The parties have submitted brief. This is the court’s decision.



DECISION

The Board’s decision is AFFIRMED. The Order staying detachment from the District is vacated.



DISCUSSION

In an appeal from a SDBAB decision “...the only issues to be considered are whether the reorganization authority acted within its jurisdiction and whether its order is arbitrary or capricious.” School District of Waukesha v. SDBAB, 201 Wis.2d 109, 116, 548 N.W.2d 122 (1996).



I.

Neither party has alleged that the Board exceeded the jurisdictional grant. Therefore the court need not address the issue.



II.

Arbitrary or capricious action “...occurs when the findings of the agency are unreasonable or without a rational basis. An action is arbitrary if it is the result of an ‘unconsidered, willful and irrational choice’ and not the result of the ‘winnowing and sifting’ process.” Id. In addition, the Board, is required to “consider all of the factors enumerated in §117.15 Stats.” Id.

Section 117.15 outlines the eight statutory criteria that the Board “shall” consider. At the very crux of Ladysmith’s argument is the assertion that the Board failed to consider the financial effects on the apportionment of assets and liabilities following detachment. Ladysmith acknowledges indirectly that the Board did consider all other relevant factors. A cursory review of the record confirms that fact. Ladysmith’s argument is however that.

1. Neither Ladysmith nor Flambeau School Districts’ presented evidence as to the financial affects on the apportionment of assets and liabilities;

2. The Board did not have relevant information necessary to make the “rational” decision;

3. Without appropriate information, the decision is not based upon the “winnowing and sifting” process that is required; and

4. The Board should have adjourned the administrative proceedings and instructed the parties to produce the needed information.

In essence, Ladysmith argues that without evidence as to one of the factors, there can not be the “winnowing and sifting” process. It suggests as a remedy the remand of these proceeding to the Board for rehearing. The court declines that invitation.

There is little question that neither party introduced evidence relating to the financial impact detachment of Hawkins would have on either Ladysmith or Flambeau School Districts. Board members Ostertag and Silver admitted as much in their decision. Appellant’s rebuttal brief, page 3 and Transcript pp 138-139. Therefore, the success or failure of Ladysmith’s argument depends upon the meaning of the “winnowing and sifting process.”

Our appellate courts have used this phraseology frequently. The language first appeared in Olson v. Rothwell, 28 Wis.2d 233, 137 N.W.2d 86 (1965) in the context of a Rock County - Green County school boundary dispute. The Court said: “Arbitrary action is the result of an unconsidered, willful and irrational choice of conduct and not the result of the ‘winnowing and sifting’ process. The Rock County school committee, in considering and in doing what might be said to be the “best it could do as it saw the problem confronting it” did not arbitrarily exercise its power.” Id, p. 239 (The court’s emphasis) The court has repeatedly referenced the “winnowing and sifting process’ without specific explanation of what that process entails in the following cases; Joint School District v. State Appeal Board 56 Wis.2d 790, 797, 203 N.W. 2d 1 (1972); Joint School District #2 v. State Appeal Board 83 Wis.2d 711, 720, 266 N.W.2d 374 (1977); City of Beloit v. State Appeal Board 103 Wis2d 661, 667, 309 N.W.2d 392 (1981); and School District of Waukesha v. SDBAB, Op. Cit. Although the courts have not specifically described what the “winnowing and sifting” process requires, the essential analysis does instruct. In rendering decisions in the various cases, both the Supreme Court and the Appellate Courts have emphasized that the process by the Board involves the evaluation of the evidence presented to it during the initial administrative review. As noted above, in Rothwell the Supreme Court observed that the Rock County committee did “the best it could...” with the information presented. Although not expressing the same thought, all other appellate courts have analyzed the facts in similar fashion. They recited the facts that were presented against the legal standard and rendered a decision. Likewise in School District of Waukesha v. SDRAB the Court of Appeals applied the facts to the legal standard. In doing so however, the court stated, “The record reveals that the panel carefully sifted “all of the information” and applied the statutory criteria. ...We conclude that this determination was the result of a rational fact finding process” pg. 118 (Emphasis by the Court) The language of both Rothwell and Waukesha suggest that the Board does not need evidence of each Section 117.15 criteria before it may decide a detachment dispute.

Rather, the “winnowing and sifting” process requires the Board to evaluate the evidence as presented and then decide the issue on the basis of that information. The Court is satisfied that the Board employed the “winnowing and sifting” process in this case. It is evident from the record that much information and data was presented by the two school districts, as well as the petitioners. That information is outlined in the Board’s decision. See Decision criterion 1 through 8. There is evidence in the record to support those findings. (Normally this court would recite all facts necessary to support each individual Board finding. However, in that this decision needs to be rendered immediately and any appeal front the circuit court decision only reviews the Board’s decision, the court incorporates the record and findings in summary fashion.) The Board reviewed the evidence, and from that evidence — whether complete as to all statutory factors — rendered its decision. That process is the “winnowing and sifting” process referred to in the case law.

School District of Waukesha v. SDAB is also instructive in this dispute due to its factual similarities. There, appellants made the same argument to the circuit court as is being made here, That is, if the board fails to receive evidence as to one of the factors, there exists a flaw in the “winnowing and sifting” process. See footnote 4, page 118. The circuit judge in Waukesha accepted the argument. The Court of Appeals rejected the theory saying, “A determination by this court that evidence presented by one school district of its resources necessitates at similar presentation by the other school district would impinge on the SDBABs legislative policy-making function and is permanently expand this courts’ scope of review.” pg, 119. The court concludes that the same analysis is appropriate here. Any remand by this court for more fact-finding impinges upon the Board’s legislative policy making function.

The Board need not adjourn detachment hearings where one — or both — of the parties fail to introduce evidence as to one (or more) of the statutory criteria. The Board’s obligation is to receive the evidence, and from whatever evidence received, “winnow and sift” to reach a rational conclusion. That is precisely what the board did in this instance.



III.

Ladysmith also alleges as err the consolidation of all five petitions for hearing purposes. The District however claims no authority to support that argument. The court finds no fault in the Board’s process. The petitions were heard and decided together because the parties — specifically Ladysmith — proceeded in that fashion. As noted by the Attorney General’s brief, Ladysmith may not invite err. therefore the court rejects Ladysmith’s legal theory.



ORDER

Counsel for the Board is directed to prepare a final judgment consistent with this decision.



Dated this 19th day of August, 2009.



BY THE COURT:



Hon. Eugene D. harrington

Circuit Court Judge